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ABSTRACT: 
Prior to April 2007, acceptance and performance testing of the various Special Nuclear 
Material (SNM) monitoring devices at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was performed by the 
Radiological Health Instrumentation department. Calibration and performance testing on 
the PM-700 personnel portal monitor was performed, but there was no test program for 
the VM-250 vehicle portal monitor. The handheld SNM monitors, the TSA model 470B, 
were being calibrated annually, but there was no performance test program. In April of 
2007, the Material Control and Accountability Manager volunteered to take over 
performance testing of all SNM portal monitors at NTS in order to strengthen the 
program and meet U.S. Department of Energy Order requirements. This paper will 
discuss the following activities associated with developing a performance testing 
program: changing the culture, learning the systems, developing and implementing 
procedures, troubleshooting and repair, validating the process, physical control of 
equipment, acquisition of new systems, and implementing the performance test program. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
The Nevada Test Site (NTS) safeguards and security is accomplished by three different 
contractors: National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec); Wackenhut Services 
Incorporated (WSI); and Professional Analysis Incorporated (PAI). There are many 
challenges to overcome when three different companies have similar and overlapping 
responsibilities with the same customer, but are very much autonomous organizations 
with separate visions and goals. Changing the mindset and culture that work could be 
done by a different group or shared among groups was a new concept. Helping a group 
complete their work, improving the way work is accomplished, and helping groups work 
more effectively together in a changing workplace was a huge accomplishment. 
   
Prior to 2005, the NTS Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) department was 
operated on a part-time basis. MC&A functions were carried out by Radiological Health 
Instrumentation department and/or the various National Laboratories. In 2005 a 
permanent NSTec NTS MC&A department was formed, and since that time a fully 
staffed, compliant program has been established. One particular area of focus for the 
MC&A department was Special Nuclear Material (SNM) portal monitors.  
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These monitors are required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order to detect 
unshielded SNM. The types of SNM monitors at the NTS include pedestrian portal 
monitors, vehicle portal monitors, and handheld SNM monitors. The PM-700 model 
pedestrian portal monitors include a metal detector and X-ray machine that are used to 
detect SNM shielding material. The VM-250 model vehicle portal monitor is used for 
vehicles and large equipment when exiting some security areas. The TSA model 470B 
handheld monitor is used when a fixed portal monitor is not functioning. This equipment 
is operated and monitored by WSI Protective Force personnel. 
 
In April 2007, the calibration and performance testing of the pedestrian portal monitors 
was being performed by the NSTec Radiological Health Instrumentation department  The 
testing program for the SNM vehicle portal monitor and the portable handheld SNM 
monitors was non-existent. Because the Radiological Health Instrumentation department 
had the personnel qualified to do the maintenance and calibration of the SNM monitors, 
the decision was made for the Radiological Health Instrumentation department to 
continue doing the vehicle portal monitor maintenance and calibration. The MC&A 
department volunteered to manage the performance testing of all SNM portal monitors in 
order to strengthen the program and ensure DOE Order requirements were met. 
  
DISCUSSION:  
When the MC&A department took over the performance testing program, the pedestrian 
portal monitors were operational but had some minor maintenance issues. Radiological 
Health Instrumentation department personnel were able to quickly repair the pedestrian 
portal monitors. The vehicle portal monitor had been out of service for an extended 
period of time. This was the result of a 2004 DOE Headquarters Office of Independent 
Oversight (OIO) survey finding that had not been closed. The root cause for the finding 
was initially determined to be the fact that the distance between the vehicle portal 
monitor pillars was several feet further than the manufacturer’s recommended distance 
for optimum performance. Because of the added distance between the pillars, the 
sensitivity test failed to detect the radiological check source that was being used for 
testing. There was a misconception that the check source being used for the sensitivity 
testing of the vehicle portal monitor was the only check source that could be used.   
 
The two solutions proposed to correct the problem were to install a completely new 
vehicle portal monitor system or to relocate the vehicle portal monitor pillars. Both of 
these options were very expensive.  As a result, the OIO finding had not be closed, and 
the WSI Security Police Officers (SPOs) were performing SNM monitoring with the 
handheld SNM monitors. The MC&A supervisor recommended that the check source 
activity be based on a representative, worst case item from the Nuclear Material (NM) 
inventory. The check source needed to represent the smallest quantity of NM that 
requires detection. This was a significantly larger activity than the activity of the check 
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source that had been used for testing the vehicle portal monitor. Calculations were 
performed to determine the appropriate activity needed for the check source to meet the 
detection threshold.  
 
To prove the concept and verify there were no other problems with the vehicle portal 
monitor, check sources with the new calculated value were collected from organizations 
such as Radiological Health Instrumentation department. These sources were then used to 
test and confirm the vehicle portal monitor met the detection threshold.  While testing the 
vehicle portal monitor,  some minor maintenance issues were discovered. Radiological 
Health Instrumentation department personnel were able to troubleshoot and repair these 
minor problems and establish a list of spare parts needed to adequately maintain the 
system in the future. 
 
New radiological check sources and spare parts were procured. When the new check 
sources arrived, MC&A personnel informally tested the vehicle portal monitors to ensure 
the vehicle portal monitor functioned as required. Once the operability was verified, 
calibration and testing procedures were performed to verify the probability of detection 
and operability of all SNM portal monitors. Radiological Health Instrumentation 
department had approved calibration testing procedures in place for the pedestrian portal 
monitors only.  These procedures were outdated and needed to be revised. Calibration 
and testing procedures for the vehicle and handheld SNM monitors were non-existent and 
would need to be developed. Using the ASTM International Standard Guides, vendor 
manuals, and other related documentation, Radiological Health Instrumentation 
department personnel developed new calibration procedures, and MC&A personnel 
developed new testing procedures. The procedures were officially approved and 
validated. Calibration and testing is now performed on a routine basis. 
 
Other issues were discovered in the process of implementing the program. The handheld 
SNM monitors were not being physically controlled to prevent unauthorized access. DOE 
Orders and the NTS MC&A Plan require that access to SNM monitoring equipment be 
restricted to personnel that participate in the Human Reliability Program (HRP). In years 
past, SPOs did not perform official duties prior to being cleared and HRP certified. 
Because of new protection strategies for the site, some of the newly hired SPOs are 
performing official duties while awaiting their HRP certification. These SPOs and some 
non-HRP certified Radiological Health Instrumentation department personnel had 
physical access to the SNM handheld monitors. WSI and Radiological Health 
Instrumentation department agreed to implement administrative controls so that only 
HRP personnel have access to the SNM handheld monitors. Each unit, when not in use, is 
marked “HRP Only” and is in an authorized location that cannot be accessed by an 
unauthorized person. Also, the procurement and installation of a MT-220 portal 
monitoring system in a Category I facility was performed without input from the MC&A 
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department.  Once notified, the MC&A department assisted the WSI Project Manager 
with developing procedures and performing acceptance testing so that the MT-220 could 
be placed into service. While testing the portal monitor, Radiological Health 
Instrumentation department, WSI, and MC&A personnel identified issues that were not 
previously identified during the design phase. WSI electronic technicians were able to 
correct the problems. Radiological Health Instrumentation department and MC&A 
personnel were able to develop a test procedure to ensure the system functioned properly. 
This allowed the new system to be validated and put into service on schedule. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
The SNM portal monitoring performance testing program is now fully implemented. All 
actions to implement the SNM portal monitoring performance test program were 
successfully completed in December 2007. The efforts of individuals from all contractor 
companies resulted in a substantial cost avoidance for NTS. The vehicle portal monitor 
did not have to be modified or replaced. By clarifying individual’s roles and how they 
relate to each other, old paradigms are beginning to shift. The Corrective Action Closure 
package for the finding against the vehicle portal monitor has now been submitted for 
closure and validation by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security 
Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). NNSA/NSO validated the operation of 
the vehicle portal monitor, and it was put into operation for the first time since 2004. In a 
recent OIO inspection, there were no findings on the portal monitoring program. 
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